Merge pull request #334435 from SigmaSquadron/xsa/2024-08-13

xen: patch with XSA-460 and XSA-461
This commit is contained in:
Emily
2024-08-15 04:39:23 +01:00
committed by GitHub
5 changed files with 50 additions and 3 deletions
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ let
inherit fetchpatch;
};
upstreamPatchList = lib.lists.flatten [ upstreamPatches.XSA_458 ];
upstreamPatchList = lib.lists.flatten [
upstreamPatches.XSA_458
upstreamPatches.XSA_460
upstreamPatches.XSA_461
];
in
callPackage (import ../generic.nix {
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ let
upstreamPatchList = lib.lists.flatten [
upstreamPatches.QUBES_REPRODUCIBLE_BUILDS
upstreamPatches.XSA_458
upstreamPatches.XSA_460
upstreamPatches.XSA_461
];
in
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ let
upstreamPatchList = lib.lists.flatten [
upstreamPatches.QUBES_REPRODUCIBLE_BUILDS
upstreamPatches.XSA_458
upstreamPatches.XSA_460
upstreamPatches.XSA_461
];
in
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ let
inherit fetchpatch;
};
upstreamPatchList = lib.lists.flatten [ upstreamPatches.QUBES_REPRODUCIBLE_BUILDS ];
upstreamPatchList = lib.lists.flatten [
upstreamPatches.QUBES_REPRODUCIBLE_BUILDS
upstreamPatches.XSA_460
upstreamPatches.XSA_461
];
in
callPackage (import ../generic.nix {
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ in
})
];
# Xen Security Advisory #458: (4.16 - 4.19-rc3)
# Xen Security Advisory #458: (4.16.6 - 4.19-rc3)
"XSA_458" = xsaPatch {
id = "458";
title = "Double unlock in x86 guest IRQ handling";
@@ -114,4 +114,39 @@ in
cve = [ "CVE-2024-31143" ];
hash = "sha256-yHI9Sp/7Ed40iIYQ/HOOIULlfzAzL0c0MGqdF+GR+AQ=";
};
# Xen Security Advisory #460: (4.16.6 - 4.19.0)
"XSA_460" = xsaPatch {
id = "460";
title = "Error handling in x86 IOMMU identity mapping";
description = ''
Certain PCI devices in a system might be assigned Reserved Memory
Regions (specified via Reserved Memory Region Reporting, "RMRR") for
Intel VT-d or Unity Mapping ranges for AMD-Vi. These are typically used
for platform tasks such as legacy USB emulation.
Since the precise purpose of these regions is unknown, once a device
associated with such a region is active, the mappings of these regions
need to remain continuouly accessible by the device. In the logic
establishing these mappings, error handling was flawed, resulting in
such mappings to potentially remain in place when they should have been
removed again. Respective guests would then gain access to memory
regions which they aren't supposed to have access to.
'';
cve = [ "CVE-2024-31145" ];
hash = "sha256-3q4nAP2xGEptX6BIpSlALOt2r0kjj1up5pF3xCFp+l0=";
};
# Xen Security Advisory #461: (4.16.6 - 4.19.0)
"XSA_461" = xsaPatch {
id = "461";
title = "PCI device pass-through with shared resources";
description = ''
When multiple devices share resources and one of them is to be passed
through to a guest, security of the entire system and of respective
guests individually cannot really be guaranteed without knowing
internals of any of the involved guests. Therefore such a configuration
cannot really be security-supported, yet making that explicit was so far
missing.
'';
cve = [ "CVE-2024-31146" ];
hash = "sha256-JQWoqf47hy9WXNkVC/LgmjUhkxN0SBF6w8PF4aFZxhM=";
};
}